This Monday, June 8, Berlin marked the end of the European Future Combat Aircraft (Scaf) project, considering that it was no longer possible to converge industrial positions. In other words, the German subsidiary of Airbus Defense and Space, supported by Berlin, refused to engage in a program in which Dassault Aviation was the prime contractor.
This is a massive failure. Huge costs have already been incurred in the design of the Scaf. Europe is losing a complete and interoperable air combat system (with drones and planes linked by a combat cloud). But above all, it is defense Europe that is at a standstill.
Indeed, this is not the first Franco-German failure in the military domain. The maritime patrol aircraft supposed to replace the Atlantic 2 had collapsed when Berlin finally opted for the American P-8A.
Recurrent abandonment of Franco-German projects
France withdrew from the Eurodrone project, launched with Germany, Spain and Italy, because it was too cumbersome and becoming obsolete in view of developments in the war in Ukraine. The European Commission’s Iris² low-orbit satellite constellation project, at the heart of which is the French company Eutelsat, is weakened by German attempts to form its own low-orbit constellation.
Finally, European – and in particular Franco-German – military-industrial projects are often abandoned, or brought to fruition but at the cost of high costs (as with the Tiger helicopter), considerable delays (as with the MGCS land combat system project) or even obsolescence before even entering service.
States must overcome national divisions
If these failures are sometimes due to friction between companies, as here between Airbus and Dassault, the problem is deeper. What is wrong is above all the incapacity of European states to overcome their national divisions. Everyone wants more Europe, but a Europe in line with its own national priorities.
Examples. Germany is an exporting country which relies on its sales abroad to make its investments profitable, whereas France is above all concerned with the operational efficiency of its army.
France, a nuclear power, wants its planes to be able to carry the bomb, whereas Germany sees this as an additional cost (despite the American withdrawal and the European scope of French deterrence…). Many European countries want to buy American protection, turning away from European solutions, where France aims above all for sovereignty.
Distinct national strategies
Same with the European preference: internationally oriented countries, like Germany, fear reprisals, while France emphasizes the importance of strategic autonomy in critical sectors. Finally, and more trivially, Berlin has often been reluctant to engage in programs in which German industry did not occupy a central position.
These numerous industrial failures are gradually burying the hopes of a large European BITD (defense industrial and technological base). However, this is crucial: cost sharing, economies of scale, limitation of duplication, interoperability in the face of the Russian threat, etc.
Achieve common defense equipment
The European Commission is also working hard to encourage Member States to cooperate with each other: the Safe loan program (Safe Action for Europe) provides 800 billion euros in loans at preferential rates to Member States to finance purchases of military equipment, provided that 65% of the components come from European countries, the European Free Trade Association, Ukraine or Canada.
Likewise, in its European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS), the Commission has set the objective of achieving a rate of 40% of equipment acquired jointly between at least two Member States.
But pan-European industrial value chains cannot be decreed. And we shouldn’t wait for the solution from manufacturers either. In this regard, it should be noted that the Airbus success, often cited as an example of a successful European project, benefited from a rare alignment of interests and significant profitability in the global civil aviation market. This project is more of an exception than the rule.
Overcoming divisions and national pride
The solution is political: without partial centralization of defense industrial policy, we risk continuing to take five years to make investment decisions that take six months in the United States or China. It is about overcoming divisions and national pride, promoting compromise and accelerating decision-making to avoid another “strange defeat”, due to an army unsuited to modern conflicts.
To achieve this, the European Commission could play the role of arbiter by proposing, from the design stage of projects, a fair distribution of tasks. While favoring modular equipment to allow States to invest in certain specific options.
Defense Europe, although it has been floundering for fifteen years, is not a pet hobby of smug Europeanists. Geopolitical news, marked by American disengagement and the Russian threat, shows us that interoperability and speed of decision-making are more necessary than ever.
The very idea of a European army is secondary. The urgency is first of all to have compatible equipment, common industrial chains and decision-making procedures capable of keeping up with the pace of the world.
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