The reception, in April, of Sarah Mullally, archbishop of Canterbury and primate of the Anglican Church, by Leo XIV is part of a context of astonishment, even hope, nourished by the contrast of situations. In France, this event is linked to the renewed call of the Church to pray for vocations, an invitation which implicitly reaffirms a call reserved only for men with a view to the presbyterate.
This coincidence raises a persistent question, already old but now revived: how can we understand, in the current context, the maintenance of this institutionalized exclusion? Can it still be perceived as legitimate, at a time when societal and ecclesial developments are increasingly questioning the foundations of such distinctions?
Direct discrimination
The reflection here is placed on the legal ground, since, otherwise, the doctrine remains unchanged. It is thus a question of bringing this question out of a strictly internal framework, long confined to a closed normative system. Long confined to theological or ecclesiological debates, it has irreversibly become a question of law. It places the jurist faced with a major normative tension: on the one hand, the principle of equality between the sexes and the prohibition of discrimination; on the other, freedom of religion, understood as including the organizational autonomy of religious communities.
However, this tension is no longer abstract. It crystallizes in a clear institutional practice: the call to “hire” only boys, the exclusion of women from ordination. This is explicitly based on a gender criterion. It prohibits women from accessing functions which concentrate the three structuring powers of the ecclesial institution – to govern, teach and sanctify – while reserving them for men. In positive law, such differentiation corresponds to the very definition of direct discrimination: an explicit, general distinction, without the possibility of an equivalent alternative.
French law prohibits distinctions based on sex. European law enshrines equality between women and men as a fundamental principle. International law requires States to fight against discrimination, including when it is rooted in social or institutional norms.
A form of immunity
At first glance, there is therefore little doubt about the legal qualification. However, it faces a major obstacle: freedom of religion. European jurisprudence recognizes religious communities as having extensive institutional autonomy, including the ability to define their internal rules and the conditions of access to religious functions. The European Court of Human Rights consistently protects this autonomy, considering that the State cannot intervene in the internal organization of religions or in the appointment of their ministers.
This results in a form of immunity: as soon as a rule is linked to the “religious heart” of an institution, judicial control becomes minimal. But is this autonomy absolute? Nothing imposes it. European Union law introduces a decisive requirement: differences in treatment based on religious beliefs must meet strict criteria – be essential, legitimate and justified – and be subject to effective control by the judge.
From then on, a central question emerges: does being a man constitute an essential professional requirement for exercising an ordained ministry?
A differentiation that is difficult to justify
The answer, legally, is far from obvious. An essential requirement assumes an objective link with the function performed. However, the criterion of sex, applied absolutely and without exception, escapes any demonstration of functional necessity. It is based on a doctrinal justification, not on a verifiable professional requirement.
Admitting such a requirement would amount to considering that biological affiliation constitutes in itself a professional qualification. Such a position comes into direct contradiction with the contemporary foundations of non-discrimination law.
It must therefore be said clearly: the exclusion of women from ordained ministries constitutes, from the point of view of the common law of non-discrimination, a differentiation that is difficult to justify. It organizes a hierarchy of the faithful based on sex. It deprives women of access to positions of power and representation. It structurally limits their possibilities for engagement and contributes to the maintenance of gender stereotypes incompatible with the demands of equality and dignity.
Exemptions incompatible with the universality of rights
Its maintenance can only be legally founded at the cost of an extensive interpretation of freedom of religion, leading to neutralizing the application of the principle of non-discrimination in the religious sphere. It is precisely this neutralization that must be questioned today.
Freedom of religion cannot be conceived as an ability to escape the common law of fundamental rights. It must be reconciled with the other principles which structure the legal order, first and foremost equality between the sexes.
The legal route, of course, will not produce immediate effects. The courts remain cautious when it comes to the doctrinal heart of religions. But it constitutes an essential lever: it highlights contradictions, weakens justifications and contributes to a progressive redefinition of normative balances.
Because the question goes far beyond the case of the Catholic Church. It raises a fundamental question for contemporary democratic societies: to what extent can we admit, in the name of pluralism, exceptions to the principle of equality? And at what point do these derogations become incompatible with the universality of fundamental rights?
Positive law does not yet provide a fully satisfactory answer. But it carries within itself the resources for evolution. Ultimately, one thing is certain: equality between women and men is intended to apply to all social spaces – including those that claim religious autonomy.
(1) Christiane Bascou, associate professor; Monique Berré, former teacher; Lise-Marie Bosse-Platière, studies in advertising; Marie-Hélène Boisrayon, librarian; Marie-Thérèse Châtelet, religion teacher, liturgical animator; Annie Crépin, historian, honorary lecturer; Annick Guillou, former national education professor; Nicole Lemaitre, honorary professor, Sorbonne history school, Higher Institute of Ecumenical Studies; Brigitte Liatard, teacher, violence prevention and mediation in schools; Paulette Millet, layperson; Monique Pontier, university professor emeritus; Madeleine Thomas, former teacher; Marie Van Egroo Bougnet, presides over the funeral; François Becker, former university professor; Ignace Berten, Dominican theologian; Alain Boisrayon, business advisor; Lucas Chuffart, religious, priest; Jean Combe, former president of “Plein jour”, founder of “Children of silence, children of priests and nuns”; Gilles Demptos, news media consultant; Patrice Dunois-Canette, journalist, essayist; Georges Heichelbech, member of the Acat steering committee; Jean-Louis Loirat, former civil service executive; Marcel Metzger, professor emeritus of the University of Strasbourg, faculty of theology; Roger Millet, married priest since 1976; Christian Terras, editorial manager of Golias; Joseph Viennot, ordinary citizen.
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