A year ago, an unprecedented attack was deployed by Hamas in the south of Israel. Nearly 1,200 people were killed that day, 364 of whom were participating in the Nova music festival. In recent days, as of October 1, it was estimated that around a hundred Israeli hostages are still being held by the Islamic Resistance movement in the Gaza Strip.
As we commemorate the first anniversary of this event which marks a turning point in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Vincent Lemire, professor of contemporary history at the Gustave Eiffel University in Paris, answers questions from 20 Minutes.
Can we say that the October 7 attack is the worst day in Israel’s history since its proclamation in 1948?
Yes, without a doubt, because there is no comparable precedent. With 1,200 deaths in a single day, it is the darkest and deadliest day since the creation of Israel. Remember that this terrorist attack is an incursion within Israeli territory; the attack does not take place in the occupied territories.
It’s a sort of Israeli September 11, but worse, because it was a “long-term attack”. On the evening of September 11, 2011 in the United States, it was apocalyptic but everything was over: the two towers had fallen. As Israel wakes up on October 8, 2023 with 250 hostages. So in a way, it all begins.
Would you say that this attack has changed the nature of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or accelerated its level of violence?
The attack of October 7 opened a new chapter in the conflict: that of existential war, when both parties consider that it is their very existence that is at stake. Of course, this moment is linked to the above, but it is also singular.
Let me explain: from the end of the 19th century to 1917, there was the emergence of two competing national projects. Then from 1917 to 1947, there were sporadic clashes under international supervision. Then from 1947 to 1987, there were the Israeli-Arab wars, conventional wars between states. They remain under control because they are punctuated by ceasefires and even peace treaties. Finally, from 1987 to 2017, we witness an alternation of Palestinian uprisings (intifadas) and negotiations, notably with the Oslo peace process, launched in 1991 and whose last major conference took place in Annapolis in 2007. Since then, the situation keeps getting worse. And on October 7, 2023, we shifted into something else, everyone fighting for their existence.
Can the observation of a failure to provide security for the population of Israel by Benjamin Netanyahu call into question his leadership?
The issue of security is fundamental in the history of the State of Israel, created to provide security for Jews in the diaspora threatened by anti-Semitism. This is what justifies the Zionist project, therefore the creation of this State.
But after a year full of tragic events, this observation of failure by Benyamin Netanyahu has been partly obscured. And this is the Prime Minister’s bet: to stay in power by provoking mirror events to cover up the trauma of October 7, and in a certain way absolve it. For the moment, he is winning in this headlong rush, since his popularity has risen in the polls.
What do we know about security failures one year after the attack?
It is not only Benjamin Netanyahu who failed but also his entire government. His minister Bezalel Smotrich, responsible for the economy and settlements in the West Bank, had obtained a few weeks before the attack the movement of several thousand soldiers from around the Gaza Strip to the West Bank. Its objective was to protect the settlers who were then carrying out abuses against Palestinian civilians.
These soldiers were missing at the time of the attack on October 7. This is the reason why, in addition to a security failure, as has been said many times, it is also a more global strategic blindness which has been to the detriment of Israeli citizens.
It should also be noted that the investigations which began to be carried out after October 7 are for the moment suspended. Neither international observers, nor Israeli citizens, nor journalists have access to reliable information to explain such a security and strategic fiasco.
We see that the extension of the conflict has begun. Is this what Benjamin Netanyahu is looking for?
Very objectively, on a tactical and political level, it has an interest in the extension of the conflict and the conflagration. First to cover October 7, as I said. But also because by dragging the United States into the war, it can hamper the campaign of the Democrats, who are divided on support for Israel, unlike the Republicans. If there is a regional conflagration, Harris’ campaign will be more upset than Trump’s.
Even if he has no plan for “the day after” and even if he leads his country into a strategic impasse that contravenes Israel’s vital interests, Benjamin Netanyahu derives political benefits from remaining on this path. .
We see that the relationship with the United States has been reversed. It is Israel which dictates the geostrategic agenda to American power while the latter holds military pre-eminence and provides means to the IDF. Benjamin Netanyahu lied several times to his ally, making him believe that he was going to accept the ceasefire in Gaza and finally torpedoing it. Nor did he warn him of the elimination of the leader of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah (on September 27).
Under what conditions can the troubled period opened by the attack of October 7 calm down?
We saw that the Israeli Prime Minister had an interest in the conflagration. He is one of the leaders who think that the reign of international law is over, and that we have entered that of force. Yahya Sinouar, leader of Hamas, also has an interest in this conflagration, to loosen the military grip on the Gaza tunnels. The only good news is that the two other actors, Hezbollah and Iran, have no interest in it. Because Iran’s only strategic line is the protection of its nuclear program.
There was an extremely brutal Israeli reaction after October 7, with the deployment of means generally used by terrorist organizations. Hacking pagers – that is, turning thousands of civilian objects into weapons of war – amounts to terrorist methods. Let us also remember that several hundred people died during the strike against the leader of Hezbollah.
After the targeted assassination of the leader of Hamas (Ahmed Yassine) in March 2004, Jacques Chirac condemned it, saying that it was contrary to international law. Twenty years ago, we knew that democracies cannot use terrorist methods to fight terrorism. Since then, all these red lines have been crossed.
What could be France’s role in the hoped-for de-escalation?
It cannot remain inert because it is home to the first Jewish community and the first Arab community in Europe. The consequences of the conflict on public opinion are therefore much greater than elsewhere. And then it has a permanent seat on the Security Council, the only European seat since Brexit and the departure of the United Kingdom. France supplied Israel with its weapons until the 1960s and it was France which gave it nuclear weapons. Its historical links are also very strong with Palestine and, of course, with Lebanon.
This summer, France looked at itself, focused on its national issues. But at the end of September, the joint call by the United States and France for a ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon represented a real diplomatic breakthrough and an opportunity for de-escalation that Netanyahu could have seized. Diplomacy has rarely been as criticized as today, but it has never been more essential.
